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COMMENTS
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM THE
HARMFUL BEHAVIOR OF ADULTS
ERIC C. SHEDLOSKY*
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized family integrity to be a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the U.S. Constitution. The Court
has recognized that implicit to the family integrity interest is the right to
self-determine one's own family life, and in the case of parents, to manage
the upbringing of children. However, as child protection has become a
more prominent public concern, the state's escalating interest in ensuring
the wellbeing of children has permitted it to intervene in areas historically
addressed exclusively within the walls of the family home. This Comment
argues that the state's interest in the wellbeing of children extends both to
protecting a child's physical health and to protecting the less tangible
considerations of a child's wellbeing, such as emotional welfare,
psychological development, and ability to flourish as a member of society.
This Comment further argues that by imposing criminal liability, rather
than civil remedies, in situations where an adult places a child's physical,
psychological, or emotional wellbeing at risk, the state will further two
important initiatives. First, it will encourage a shift in the public's
perception of the state's role in protecting children, and second, it will
permit the state to better protect children from the harmful behavior of
adults.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the outside, Detective Gary Brandl concluded that Judith
Scruggs's home was well cared for, well kept, and cute for the area of
* J.D. 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. I am grateful for the guidance,
feedback, and suggestions provided by Assistant Professor Kenworthey Bilz and for the
extensive editing and comments provided by Prudence Beidler Car, J.D. 2007.
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town.' However, upon opening the front door, he was faced with the
timeless grade school lesson: you can't judge a book by its cover.2
The police were called to the Scruggs's home after Judith's twelve-
year-old son, Joseph Daniel, was found hanging by a necktie in his
bedroom closet.3 Despite the pleasant exterior of the Scruggs's home, the
conditions in which the family lived shocked investigators. 4 Surprisingly,
from the outside, there were none of the usual indicators of disarray: the
home's structure was in good repair, the utilities were working, there was
no evidence of drug or alcohol abuse, and the neighbors even appeared
friendly. Instead, the shocking conditions were caused by Judith Scruggs's
failure to implement basic housekeeping practices.5
In investigating Joseph Daniel's suicide, state officials generalized the
Scruggs's home as disturbingly dirty, cluttered, and unsafe.6 They reported
that the house was besieged by a foul and offensive odor, a stench that
Detective Brandl colorfully related to a mixture of "fermented garbage" and
"as if you stuck your head in a dirty clothes hamper.",7 The piles of clutter,
junk, and debris that permeated the entire house stunned officials.' In
making their way through the apartment, investigators could not help but
step on mirrors, glass, and other breakables hidden beneath the mess that
completely hid the floor.9 They observed that the furniture, counters, and
tables were unusable because they were all covered with dirty clothing, old
food, disposable food containers, trash, unwashed kitchenware, and other
clutter.10 They reported that they saw no clear space in the kitchen where
food could be prepared or consumed because all the flat surfaces, including
1 Suicide of a 12-Year-Old, CBS NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2003/1 0/28/6011/main580507.shtml.
2 See id. (reporting Detective Brandl's opinion of the Scruggs's home "changed 180




6 STATE OF CONN. OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE & THE CHILD FATALITY REVIEW
PANEL, INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF JOSEPH DANIEL S. ii, 15-16 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter
CHILD FATALITY REVIEW REPORT].
7 Suicide of a 12-Year-Old, supra note 1.





the ironing board, were covered with junk.1 In short, the Scruggs's home
was "disgusting," "filthy," and generally "a safety hazard.'
12
Four months after Joseph Daniel's death, Judith was arrested and
charged with two counts of risk of injury to a child 3 and one count of
cruelty to persons.' 4 In bringing these charges, the State attempted to make
it clear that it was not prosecuting Judith for causing her son's suicide.
15
Instead, the prosecution was attempting to hold her responsible for creating
and maintaining a dangerous home environment and for negligently
depriving her son of proper physical care. 16 Despite the State's efforts to
separate these charges from Joseph Daniel's death, the media and the public
often failed to recognize any distinction.'
7
Judith was convicted of one count of risk-of-injury-to-a-minor for
providing a home environment that was likely to injure her son's mental
and emotional health. 18 The court explained that Judith's conviction was
about more than merely a messy home' 9-it was rooted in her having
placed Joseph Daniel in a situation that was likely to injure his mental
health.2° In response to the continuing inaccuracies as to the foundation of
the charges, the court noted that Judith's conviction was not based on an
assertion that the law "regulates the frequency of vacuuming or prescribes
specific housekeeping practices," but rather that the law "requires a parent
11 Id.
12 Id. (quoting Police Aff., State of Conn. Super. Ct., Application for Arrest Warrant
(Apr. 22, 2002)); see also Marc Santora, Case Tries to Link a Mother to Her Boy's Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at B1; Suicide of a 12-Year-Old, supra note 1.
13 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (2007).
14 See id. § 53-20; State v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24, 26-28 (Conn. 2006).
15 State v. Scruggs, No. CR 020210921S, 2004 WL 1245557, at *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 8, 2004), rev'd, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006).
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., Alaine Griffin, State Not Likely to Seek Prison Term for Scruggs, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 13, 2004, at Al; Traci Neal, Everyone Was Responsible, HARTFORD
ADVOCATE, Nov. 13, 2003, at A1; Marc Santora, After a Son's Suicide, Mother Is Convicted
over Unsafe Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at BI; Santora, supra note 12, at B1; Suicide
of a 12-Year-Old, supra note I ("Scruggs went on trial last month. It was one of the first
times a parent has been charged in connection with a child's suicide.").
"8 Scruggs, 2004 WL 1245557, at *7. However, Judith's conviction was ultimately
overturned by the Connecticut Supreme Court, which found that Connecticut's risk-of-injury
statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Judith's conduct. See infra notes 145-47
and accompanying text.
"9 Scruggs, 2004 WL 1245557, at *1 n.2 ("The fact that the child committed suicide was
relevant evidence concerning the risk to the child ... but was not itself an element of the
offense charge .... The same violation, creating and maintaining a situation that endangered
the child's mental health, would have existed even had the child not committed suicide.").
20 Id. at *7.
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to provide a home that does not cause risk of harm to a child's mental
health."21
Under Connecticut's risk-of-injury-to-a-minor statute, Judith could
have been sentenced to a term of up to ten years in prison.22 However, at
the request of the state prosecutor, the Connecticut Superior Court granted
her a suspended sentence and five years of probation.23 Although the
prosecutor did not explain why he decided not to seek jail time after making
the controversial decision to prosecute Judith,24 scholars suspect it was
because criminal punishment would have had little purpose.25 Nonetheless,
the prosecutor commented that probation was necessary because "the law
requires parents and caregivers to protect their children, to keep them safe,
[and] to make sure they are not subject to risks to their heath.' 26 In short,





Judith's trial and the public debates that ensued from her conviction
raised an important question regarding the appropriate roles of parents and
the state in raising and protecting children. Should parental autonomy be
protected as an ultimate authority in the rearing of children? Or does the
state have an interest in the nurturing and development of children that
justifies an assertion of primacy over parents? Traditionally, parents were
deemed to have a paramount interest in raising their children and the state's
guidance was considered to be an inadequate substitute.28 However,
parental autonomy has since been qualified and limited through a shift in
institutional policy that has directed the general focus of protection from the
preservation of families to the wellbeing of children.29 In escalating the
state's interest in ensuring the wellbeing of children, the law has
maneuvered into an awkward position of "attempting to maintain a
21 Id.
22 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (2007).
23 No Jail for Mom in Son's Suicide, CBS NEWS, May 14, 2004, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/14/national/main617614.shtml?source=search-story.
24 See, e.g., M. Lauren Gillies, Placing Blame After the Suicide of a Minor: Analysis of
State v. Scruggs and Connecticut's Risk-of-Injury Statute, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 131, 151
(2005) (reporting that various advocacy groups, sympathetic parents, and disapproving
critics protested Judith's prosecution and accused the state of "intentionally filing bogus
charges" and wrongfully prosecuting a "grieving mother who was herself a victim").
25 Id. at 155 ("The statute's purpose is to protect children, and it must be considered if




28 Joseph W. Ozmer, II, Who's Raising the Kids: The Exclusion of Parental Authority in
Condom Distribution at Public Schools, 30 GA. L. REV. 887, 897-900 (1991).
29 See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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commitment to strong parental rights"30 while simultaneously providing the
state the authority to "undermine or trump" decisions made by parents.3 1
This Comment argues that the state has an interest both in protecting
the physical health of children and in protecting the less tangible
considerations of a child's wellbeing, such as emotional welfare,
psychological development, and ability to flourish as a member of society.
For the state to intervene successfully in areas historically addressed
exclusively within the walls of the family home, it must overcome the
cultural sanctity of parental autonomy and further society's transition
towards an interventionist culture. While this cultural shift could be
encouraged by a variety of methods, this Comment suggests that one
strategy available to the state is the imposition of criminal liability, rather
than civil remedies, in situations where an adult places a child's physical,
psychological, or emotional wellbeing at risk. This Comment further
argues that imposing criminal liability through such risk-of-injury statutes
will permit the state to better protect children from the harmful behavior of
adults in addition to altering the public's perception of the state's role in
protecting children.
II. THE PARENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE
A. ESTABLISHING PARENTAL AUTONOMY
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized family integrity to be a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the U.S. Constitution.32 The Court
has recognized that implicit to the family integrity interest is the right to
self-determine one's own family life, and in the case of parents, to manage
the upbringing of their children.33 The Court first articulated the concept of
parental liberty interests in Meyer v. Nebraska.34 In Meyer, the Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected
parents' liberty interests in having their children taught in a foreign
language.35  Meyer thus struck down a state statute that prohibited
instructing students who had not yet passed the eighth grade in any
language other than English in any school.36 A few years later, the Court
30 Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 Sup.
CT. REv. 279, 279 (2000).
31 Ozmer, supra note 28, at 889-91.
32 Jessica E. Marcus, The Neglectful Parens Patraie: Using Child Protective Laws to
Defend the Safety Net, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 269-70 (2006).
33 Id. at 269.
3' 262 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1923).
" Id. at 399-402.
36 Id. at 400-03.
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reaffirmed the developing concept of parental autonomy in Pierce v. Society
.of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.37 In Pierce, the Court
restated the parental rights doctrine of Meyer and held unconstitutional a
state statute that prohibited parents from sending their children to private
schools in place of the government provided public schools.38 The Court
reasoned that the State's interest in the upbringing of children was limited
as compared to that of parents, noting that because "[t]he child is not the
mere creature of the State, those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their
children] for additional obligations. 39 In applying the Pierce reasoning in
subsequent cases, the Court has commented that:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children.
40
Accordingly, as long as parents adequately care for their children and their
decisions continue to "prepare [them] for additional obligations, 'A' there is
no reason for the state to intervene in the "private realm of the family.
42
One of the most significant contemporary decisions concerning
parental autonomy and the State's right to regulate the upbringing of
children is Wisconsin v. Yoder.43 In Yoder, the State of Wisconsin
criminally prosecuted a group of Amish parents under the State's
compulsory schooling law for failing to send their children to high school."
The Amish parents argued that application of the State's compulsory
schooling law "violated their free exercise of religion rights under the First
Amendment and their Fourteenth Amendment right to raise and educate
their children in accordance with their own beliefs' 45 because they
considered the high school education to involve "an impermissible exposure
of their children to a 'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs."
46
Relying on the parents' First Amendment argument, the Court held that the
3' 268 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925).
38 Id. at 534-35 (finding that "[u]nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska... [there is a]
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of [their] children").
31 Id. at 535.
40 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
41 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (restating the holding in Pierce, 268
U.S. at 534-35).
42 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (plurality opinion).
41 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-34; see also Ozmer, supra note 28, at 897-98.
44 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09.
45 Ozmer, supra note 28, at 897-98.
46 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
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application of the State's compulsory schooling law to this particular set of
parents was unconstitutional because it violated their rights to raise their
children in accordance with their religious beliefs.47 Although the Court
specified that its holding was grounded in the Free Exercise Clause and was
narrowly tailored towards this particular group of Amish parents,48 the
Court emphasized the importance of parental rights under the U.S.
Constitution.49 The Court referenced its decision in Pierce and described
Pierce's restatement of the parental rights doctrine of Meyer as "perhaps the
most significant statements of the [C]ourt" regarding the role of parents in
dictating the upbringing of their children.5° Concluding that the concept of
parental autonomy was well established, the Court stated that "[t]he history
and culture of Western Civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate."51
B. QUALIFYING PARENTAL AUTONOMY
Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder demonstrate the traditional view that
parental autonomy is a "fundamental liberty interest protected by the U.S.
Constitution."' While the parental rights doctrine permits parents to claim
"primacy in rearing, educating, and inculcating moral standards and
religious beliefs in their children, 53 parental autonomy has not been
interpreted as an unchecked defense to any instance of state action. In all
three cases, while deferring to parents' decisions in the upbringing of their
children, the Court noted that the disputed decisions of the parents posed no
risk to the wellbeing of the children and had little potential of creating
significant social burdens.54 In Yoder, the Court explicitly stated that it
47 James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine
of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1385-86 (1994) ("Thus, the Court in Yoder
established that the right guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause is more than just the
religious individual's right to control his own beliefs and self-determining behaviors, and a
freedom from state imposed duties to take actions inconsistent with his beliefs... [but] also
includes a liberty to control the lives and minds of one's children, to keep them to oneself,
isolated from outside influences, and to make them the type of persons one wants them to be
in light of one's own religious beliefs.").
48 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
49 Id. at 233.
50 Id. at 232.
51 Id.
52 Marcus, supra note 32, at 269.
53 Ozmer, supra note 28, at 898.
54 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 ("[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a
free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
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would be justified in limiting the power of the parent if the decision in
question had the potential to injure either the wellbeing of the child, or the
wellbeing of society.55
In addition to reaffirming that the power of a parent may be subject to
limitations if a decision imposed certain risks, the Yoder Court established a
"balancing test ... [that] weigh[ed] parental interests in fulfilling their
religious aspirations through their children against the State's interest in
protecting the welfare of children and in promoting other societal values. 56
In evaluating the facts at issue in Yoder against this test, the Court looked
beyond the individual impact that an insufficient education could have on
the children themselves, and determined that the State's interest in requiring
school attendance was "principally a societal interest in children one day
'meeting the duties of citizenship' and not becoming 'burdens on society
because of educational shortcomings."'' 57 The Court subsequently found
that even when "justifying the imposition of constraints on parental control
over [their] children's lives" with such a legitimate societal concern, "more
than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State' is required" to overcome the parental rights doctrine.58
Scholars and courts have subsequently interpreted Yoder to suggest that
laws that infringe on the power of parents "must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.., without unnecessarily restricting the
right of parents to manage their children's upbringing. '' 59  Therefore,
although parents have a right to direct lives of their children, the parental
right is not always controlling and can be superseded by a compelling state
interest.
Although the Supreme Court in Yoder held that a state's broad societal
interest in the education of its children was not sufficiently "compelling" to
justify superseding the decisions of parents, lower courts have been more
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens."); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) ("[E]xperience
shows that ... [learning a foreign language] is not injurious to the health, morals or
understanding of the ordinary child.").
55 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34; see also Michael Loatman, Protecting the Best Interest of
the Child and Free Exercise Rights of the Family, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 89, 100 (2005)
("[T]he Court in Yoder did not grant the Amish an exception regardless of the impact that [it]
would have on Amish children, but instead granted the exemption after a showing that the
exemption would not harm the schoolchildren.").
56 Dwyer, supra note 47, at 1383.
57 Id. at 1386 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224, 227).
58 Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233).
59 Marcus, supra note 32, at 269; see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 569-73 (1993) (interpreting the balancing test implemented in Yoder
to require strict scrutiny under a "compelling state interest" standard).
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deferential in reviewing states' interests and allowing state intrusion into
family decisions. Courts have repeatedly held the state's interest in
"protecting the welfare of children ' 60 and "educating children" 61 to be
adequate justifications for limiting parental autonomy, even though these
interests seem to address broad policy choices rather than narrowly defined
situations such as that presented in Yoder. In accepting these broadening
state interests as sufficient justification, courts have demonstrated a
continually evolving understanding of the parental rights doctrine.
In Troxel v. Granville, the plurality stated that a fit parent's due
process rights to control her children's upbringing were violated by a court
order, issued without deference to the parent's determination of her
children's best interests, compelling visitation rights between her children
and their grandparents.62 Although Troxel upheld the traditional view that
parents have a constitutionally protected "fundamental right.., to make
decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children,, 63 the
case's plurality opinion reflects the changing view of the "child-state-parent
relationship. ' 64 In response to Troxel's six-way split, one scholar observed
that "the division among members of the Court mirrors the American
public's conflicting views on the definition and scope of parenting. 65
Although the Court was unable to reach a majority holding, Troxel indicates
two important changes to the parental rights doctrine. First, the plurality
decision indicates that although parents' liberty interests are derived from
60 Dwyer, supra note 47, at 1403; see, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488, 500-01, 505 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affid, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (upholding a
statute granting authority to declare children wards of the State for purposes of authorizing
medical care over the objections of the parents); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 221-23
(Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980) (overruling a religious exemption to a state
law requiring vaccination of all school children because protecting the basic welfare of
children is a compelling state interest).
61 See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 116 (Mich. 1993) (upholding compulsory
education law because, "in general, it can be assumed the state has an interest in seeing that
all children within its borders are properly educated"); see also Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist.,
427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that "protecting the mental health of children
falls well within the state's broad interest in education").
62 530 U.S. 57, 67-74 (2000) (plurality opinion).
63 Id. at 66.
64 See Alessia Bell, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the Constitutional
Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 226-27 (2001); see also Buss,
supra note 30, at 279 ("Eight Justices recognized some constitutionally protected right of
parents to control their children's private associations, but seven did so haltingly, reflecting
their readiness to qualify that right in the face of... claims more compelling than those
asserted... in this case.").
65 Bell, supra note 64, at 226-27 (noting that forty-three special interest groups filed
"passionate" amicus curiae briefs on both sides of the Troxel case).
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the Due Process Clause, not all parental interests are "fundamental., 66
Therefore, absent involvement of a suspect classification, the rights of a fit
parent should be balanced against the intervening State interest through an
intermediate scrutiny test, rather than through a strict scrutiny review as
was implemented in Yoder.6 7 Second, the plurality decision suggests (and
the dissent explicitly concludes) that the Due Process Clause does not
require a finding of harm to justify unwelcome State intervention.68 These.
two changes suggest that the State is not required to demonstrate, as a
prerequisite for intervention, either that it has a compelling interest to limit
parental autonomy or that the welfare of a child or society would be harmed
by deferring to the parent's decision.
C. THE INTEREST OF THE STATE
In developing the doctrine of parental rights, the Court repeatedly
noted a caveat to parents' autonomy in directing the upbringing of their
children. In an attempt to balance parental liberty interests against the
State's interest in intervention, the Court suggested that if the parents'
interests were likely to harm either the wellbeing of their children or the
wellbeing of society, that the State's interest in preventing that harm would
be sufficiently compelling to give rise to a right on the part of the State to
intercede. 69 Through a variety of statutory mechanisms, every state has
recognized the existence of this compelling interest to intervene in
situations where the potential harm to children involves a physical injury.70
However, in considering the role and scope of parental authority in raising
children, the Court has not limited its discussions to mere concerns for a
child's physical wellbeing.71
In Pierce, the Court referred to other notions relevant to raising a child
as an interest in preparing them for "additional obligations," and held that a
66 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-74 (plurality opinion).
67 See id.; Bell, supra note 64, at 277-78 (noting that "accurately reading precedent and
promoting sound public policy, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny"); see also Fields v.
Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the State's
intervention in parental decisions relating to the education of their children did not involve
suspect classifications, and therefore should be decided under a rational basis review);
People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Mich. 1993) (holding that the state may
reasonably regulate education).
68 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58, 73, 77, 81 (plurality opinion); see also Buss, supra note 30, at
303-04.
69 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Mary Margaret Oliver & Willie Levi Crossley, New Challenges for the
Georgia General Assembly: Survey of Child Endangerment Statutes, 7 GA. B.J. 8, 8-11 (Dec.
2001).
71 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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parent not only had the right to "nurture," "direct," and "prepare" their
children for these additional obligations, but that it was their "high duty" to
do so. 72 In Yoder, the Court elaborated on the Pierce understanding of
parental rights and duties and suggested that parents had the liberty to direct
their children's upbringing in such a way as to make them the type of
people their parents want them to be.73 Similarly, in Troxel, one of the few
ideas on which the Court could agree was that a parent's interest in the
companionship, care, nurturing, and management of his or her child
deserved some amount of protection from interference.74 In each of these
cases, the Court was concerned with protecting parents' interests in these
"intangible considerations" for the same reason: because these matters have
an enormous potential to influence a child's development.75 However, just
as the state has a compelling interest to intervene where a parent's decision
threatens a child's physical wellbeing (for instance, refusing to allow a
child to receive necessary medical care),76 the state should likewise have a
compelling interest to intervene where a parent's decision threatens to
inflict non-physical harm upon a child.
In arguing that the state has an obligation to endow its citizens with the
capabilities required to function as members of society, Professor Martha
Nussbaum reasons that the state is not only required to ensure that children
receive nutritious food and an education,77 but that it has a duty to promote
and protect children's less tangible "fundamental capabilities" to ensure that
they have the opportunity to "flourish as a functioning citizen.
' 78
Nussbaum defines an individual's "fundamental capabilities" as the
characteristics and the basic abilities required to participate as a productive
member of society. 79 Nussbaum reasons that because these basic abilities
and characteristics are required to function in society, if the development of
72 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 47.
74 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 77, 79, 96 (2000) (plurality opinion).
75 See, e.g., Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, 8
FUTURE CHILD. 39, 41, 47 (1998) (noting that maltreatment-which includes a lack of
attention or affection--can adversely affect children's physical, cognitive, emotional, and
social development).
76 See supra note 60.
77 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 78-86 (2000).
78 Id. at 78-80.
79 Id.; see also Robin West, Human Capabilities and Human Authorities: A Comment on
Martha Nussbaum's Women and Human Development, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 757, 758-59
(2003) (noting that Nussbaum's fundamental capabilities range from the bare necessities of
possessing food and shelter to more abstract conceptions of maintaining bodily integrity and
possessing the ability to play and form meaningful affiliations with others).
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an individual's fundamental capabilities is neglected, the state will be
inhibited in any later attempt to promote the general welfare of society.80
Just as the Pierce and Yoder Courts suggested that considerations outside
the bare necessities of life were important in a child's development,
Nussbaum suggests that the state has an obligation to protect these
considerations so that its citizens may flourish as members of society. 1
This does not suggest that the state's interest in fostering these fundamental
capabilities should generally preempt parental autonomy, but instead, that
the state has a compelling interest to intervene when a parent's decision is
likely to harm the wellbeing of a child or the wellbeing of society.
D. PROVOKING A CULTURAL SHIFT THROUGH CRIMINAL LIABILITY
When Judith Scruggs was convicted of creating and maintaining a
dangerous home environment, her case was brought into the national
spotlight.82 She appeared on nationally broadcast television programs such
as The Oprah Winfrey Show83 and 60 Minutes 1184 to describe her son's life
and death and to tell the story of her trial. As one would expect, the story of
a grieving mother being criminally prosecuted after her child's suicide
elicited incredible amounts of public sympathy. However, this sympathy
was not universal.85 The public was generally divided into three broad
groups. The first group lamented the State's intrusion into the private realm
of family life, calling it "appalling" and "embarrassing" that the judicial
system would convict a mother who had already been through so much.86
The second group praised Connecticut's efforts to hold a parent accountable
for the harm (or the risk of harm) inflicted on a child.87 The third group was
stuck in an awkward position in the middle: they supported the State for
holding Judith accountable, but feared a general policy allowing the State to
intrude into their family lives.88
80 See West, supra note 79, at 757.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 and 45-46; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note
77.
82 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
83 See Gillies, supra note 24, at 132 (citing The Oprah Winfrey Show (CBS television
broadcast June 1, 2004)).
84 See id. (citing 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast Oct. 29, 2003)).
85 Mailbag: Judith Scruggs Guilty? (CBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Mailbag].
86 See, e.g., id. ("Judith Scruggs has already been punished.... It is appalling to me that
this mother should be facing up to 10 years in prison. If she was charged and found guilty,
everyone else who did not help this child should also be charged and found guilty.").
87 See, e.g., id. ("This mother should serve prison time, without a doubt.... Parents




The public debate that erupted out of State v. Scruggs is only a small
indication of the controversy that surrounds the concept of the state
imposing its own interests in the child-parent relationship. 89 As mentioned
above, commentators observed that while the Troxel plurality opinion
reflects the public's views on the definition and scope of parenting, there is
no majority opinion.9 In order for the state to intervene successfully in
areas historically addressed exclusively within the confines of the family
home, it must overcome opponents who are appalled by such state action.91
One method by which the state could prompt a transition towards an
interventionist culture is to "moralize" the conduct giving rise to situations
where the state has an interest to intervene.
Professor Paul Rozin described moralization as "the process through
which preferences are converted into values," at both the individual and
cultural levels.92 Rozin has tracked the moralization of cigarette smoking,
vegetarianism, drugs, and obesity in America, and suggests that as a
behavior or entity acquires moral status, it gains influence over individuals
and society. As an example of this influence, Rozin points out that the
moralization process can cause governments to take action "through
taxation or establishment of prohibitions" on the moralized behavior (e.g.,
consider the various regulations that have been enacted in the last fifty years
in relation to cigarette smoking and drinking).94
Although Rozin identifies government action as a result of
moralization, it could also function as an instigating factor to the process.
95
In criminalizing some undesirable behavior, society expresses its
condemnation of the proscribed act.96 Since, among other things, a social
stigma is attached to breaking the law, the government could use society's
disgust of violators as a "moral amplifier" 97 to influence an individual's
89 Compare J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow
the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 540, 554-72 (1985)
(arguing that the laws governing the state's ability to intervene in private family matters are
often overly ambitious and counterproductive), with Marcus, supra note 32, at 260-61
(acknowledging the need for state intervention).
90 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
91 See Mailbag, supra note 85.
92 Paul Rozin, The Process of Moralization, 10 PSYCHOL. SCIENCES 218 (1999).
93 Id. at 218-20; Paul Rozin, Maureen Markwith & Caryn Stoess, Moralization and
Becoming a Vegetarian: The Transformation of Preference into Values and the Recruitment
of Disgust, 8 PSYCHOL. Sci. 67, 67-68 (1997); Paul Rozin & Leher Singh, The Moralization
of Cigarette Smoking in the United States, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 321, 334 (1999).
94 Rozin, supra note 92, at 218; Rozin & Singh, supra note 93, at 323.
95 See Rozin & Singh, supra note 93, at 322-23.
96 See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
97 Rozin, supra note 92, at 218.
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internalized preferences. 98 By linking society's disgust of criminal behavior
to conduct that places a child's physical, psychological, or emotional
wellbeing at risk, the state could use the moralization process to alter the
public's perception of the state's role in protecting children.
III. PROTECTING CHILDREN THROUGH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. A SHIFT FROM FAMILY PRESERVATION TO CHILD PROTECTION
There have been laws against harmful conduct directed towards minors
since the colonial period.99 However the individuals, agencies, and systems
involved, and the roles of each, have changed with every new policy and
institution implemented to better safeguard the wellbeing of children. 00 In
the last ten years, the change has been marked by a general shift in
institutional policy from "family preservation '' ° to "child protection.", 0
2
Prior to this transition, the prevailing philosophy was that, except in
extreme cases, matters involving harmful conduct towards children were
handled by the civil child welfare system, which dealt "specifically and in
detail with these problems."' 0 3  However, this recent policy shift has
98 Rozin & Singh, supra note 93, at 322 (suggesting that "the most effective way to
enforce a social prohibition is to ... [link] it to disgust").
99 Besharov, supra note 89, at 540 (noting that "[m]any of the original thirteen
colonies ... had laws against certain forms of child maltreatment").
100 See, e.g., Keeping Children and Families Safe Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2003); Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1974); J. Besharov, The Legal
Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REv. 458
(1978) (discussing the effect of state reporting laws); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909) (discussing the creation of juvenile courts).
101 See Lara Jakes, Saving Kids by Splitting Families, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Aug. 23,
1998, at Al ("Since the early 1980s, judges and social workers.., placed a priority on
keeping families together, even when they [were] seriously troubled.").
102 See The Adoption and Safe Families Act, PUB. L. No. 105-89, 111 STAT. 2115 (1997)
(including provisions directing the state to terminate a parent's legal guardianship upon the
occurrence of certain events); Jakes, supra note 101, at Al ("Experts say the new policy will
help abused and neglected kids get to stable homes faster" and "[s]upporters hope it will also
guard against returning children to dangerous homes."); see also Rachel L. Swains, In a
Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at Al
("The shift.., comes as many cities and states are beginning to favor child protection over
family preservation.").
103 Martin G. Karopkin, Child Abuse and Neglect: New Role for Criminal Courts, 215
N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (1996) ("Although some. . . cases make their way into the criminal courts,
those are extreme matters, involving serious physical injury, death or more commonly,
sexual assaults."); Alison B. Vreeland, The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York
City: Sparing the Child or Spoiling the Family?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1053-54
(2000) ("Historically, the police have arrested and prosecuted parents and custodians for
child abuse, including sexual abuse. But in cases of suspected neglect, the Administration
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resulted in an increase in the number of parents who have been arrested and
criminally prosecuted for acts that previously would have been addressed
by the civil child welfare system.10 4 Since the civil and criminal systems
serve different functions and employ drastically different mechanisms, this
policy change raises the question of "whether or not arrest and criminal
prosecution are the most appropriate responses" to instances of harmful
conduct directed towards children. 105
This change in institutional policy was, in part, a response to two
events: the enactment of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act' 0 6 and
a series of highly publicized, tragic child abuse cases where children, who
had been reported to the child welfare system, were subsequently killed by
abusive parents.10 7 The Adoption and Safe Families Act changed the focus
of the child welfare system from family reunification to child protection by
requiring that the state initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights upon
the occurrence of certain events. 108  In expediting the termination of
parental rights, the federal directive openly opposed the child welfare
system's previous goal of keeping families together.10 9 The tragic child
abuse cases brought heavy criticism to the child welfare system for its
failure to prevent the deaths of the reportedly abused children."0 As a
result, states took steps to avoid a repeat of the tragic events by enacting
policies of "overreaction" to reports of child abuse, neglect, and
maltreatment."1 In New York City, this overreaction policy took the form
of a directive from both the mayor and police commissioner to the police,
instructing officers to "take action.., when they [observed] children in
dangerous situations. ' 12  The combination of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act and states' responses to the publicized child abuse cases led to
an increase in the number of child welfare cases that were directed to the
for Children's Services ('ACS') would respond .... The police ... [now] take
action ... when they see children in dangerous situations.").
104 Karopkin, supra note 103, at 1.
105 Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1054.
'06 PUB. L. No. 105-89, 111 STAT. 2115.
107 Karopkin, supra note 103, at I (noting that "a few highly publicized events have
worked to change" the approach towards child abuse and child neglect cases); Vreeland,
supra note 103, at 1054.
108 Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1069.
109 See Jakes, supra note 101; Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1070.
110 See Swains, supra note 102.
11 Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 27,
1997, at 4 (preferring to be accused of overreacting than underreacting).
112 Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1053.
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criminal courts and changed the way that the cases were handled by both
the police and the prosecutors."
1 3
B. THE DEBATE OVER CRIM1NALIZING CHILD WELFARE
New York City's involvement of the criminal justice system in minor
neglect and endangerment cases was intended to help prevent and uncover
instances of more serious abuse and to send the message that neglect and
abuse would not be tolerated.'1 14 Although New York City's strong stance
was intended to better protect children from the harmful conduct of adults,
the so-called "criminalization of child welfare" received a mixed
greeting.115  This policy shift threatened the traditionally distinct, non-
overlapping involvement of the civil child welfare and criminal justice
systems. 1 16 Prior to this change, the civil child protection system was used,
almost exclusively, to protect children from offenses perpetrated by the
victim's caregiver and most other nonviolent offenses, such as neglect and
emotional maltreatment." 17 The civil system focused on the condition of the
child and of the family." 8 If, for some reason, the condition of either was
113 Karopkin, supra note 103, at 2 ("These changes ... brought a steady stream of
criminal cases where the injuries [were] less severe or where there [was] no injury and the
charges involve[d] allegations of neglect," all offenses that previously would not have been
addressed in criminal courts.); Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1054 ("Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
has reinstated the long-abandoned practice of using police power to arrest and prosecute
parents where there is probable cause to believe a parent has endangered the welfare of a
child.").
114 See Swams, supra note 102; see also Mona Charen, With Kids, the Cautious Seldom
Err, DENV. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 67A (noting that the commissioner of the
Administration for Children's Services "has vowed to make child safety, not family
preservation, the watchword of his tenure"); Wasserman, supra note Ill ("You start
enforcing the law, a lot of people will get the message.").
115 Compare Charen, supra note 114, at 67A ("[T]he authorities appear to be on a hair
trigger now.... [I]f this is the price we must pay for more aggressive enforcement of child
welfare laws, it is well worth it."), with Megan E. McLaughlin & Roger L. Green, Child
Welfare Doesn't Belong in Police Hands; Harmful Interventions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997,
at A30 (noting "[u]nnecessary police interventions ... damage both the mother and the
child, often with lasting consequences"), and Virginia Ravenscroft-Scott, Child Welfare
Doesn't Belong in Police Hands; Harmful Interventions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A30
(voicing a reader's "horror" that a woman was arrested for living with a child in an
apartment that did not have adequate utilities).
116 David Finkelhor, Theodore P. Cross & Elise N. Cantor, U.S. Dep't of Justice, How
the Justice System Responds to Juvenile Victims: A Comprehensive Model, JUv. JUST. BULL.,
Dec. 2005, at 2-4.
17 See id. at2.
118 See id. at 2, 4-6; see also Karopkin, supra note 103, at 5 ("[T]he [civil system]
services a function very different from that of the Criminal Court. A child protective
proceeding is civil in nature ... [i]ts purpose is to protect children from injury and
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not suitable, the system would attempt to protect the child by "treating the
family" through counseling and supervision." 19 In the event that the civil
system determined that a child was at-risk, or that the treatment ordered by
the civil proceedings needed to be enforced, the child welfare agencies had
the authority to remove the child from his or her home. 20  On the other
hand, the criminal justice system was used to protect children from offenses
that were considered to be violent in nature, such as homicide, physical
assault, and sexual abuse. Because the goals of the criminal system
include the "punishment of perpetrators" and the "deterrence of potential
perpetrators," its proceedings focused on the defendant's guilt or innocence,
and little, if any, consideration was given to treating the family.122
The debate over the role of criminal courts in child welfare cases has
largely focused on these basic foundations of the civil and criminal
systems. 23  Despite considerable and increasing interaction between the
two systems, 124 opponents to the criminalization trend emphasize the two
different roles filled by the civil and criminal systems. 25 The civil child
welfare system was "designed ... to deal with the unique and complex
problems facing families."' 126 Its goals and the methods it uses to protect at-
risk children are indisputably distinct from the penal focus of the criminal
system. 127 While the criminal court generally assesses blame for a wrongful
act and imposes punishment on the offender, the civil system attempts to
address the problem without relying on the threat of sanctions. 1
28
C. THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Unfortunately, the dispositional nature of the child welfare system
does not adequately protect children from the harmful conduct of adults. Of
the children removed from their families by child welfare services, roughly
two-thirds are reunited with their families after the family unit is "treated"
mistreatment, safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well-being, and insure the
parent's right to due process of law.").
119 See Finkelhor et al., supra note 116, at 2, 4-6.
120 See id. at 4-6.
121 See id. at 2, 6-7.
122 See id.; see also Karopkin, supra note 103, at 5 ("[T]he function of the criminal
justice system is not just protection, but deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. It provides
an appropriate public response to the particular offense committed.").
123 See Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1077-78.
124 See Finkelhor et al., supra note 116, at 2.
125 See Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1075, 1077-78.
126 Id. at 1077.




by the civil system. 129 On average, over one-third of the children who are
reunited with their families have to again be removed by child welfare
services within eighteen months of going home. 130  In these failed
reunifications, each subsequent attempt to reunite the family is not
particularly permanent and usually must be tried repeatedly. 3' This
reunification process ultimately fails for about one in four children.' 32 This
means that if nine children are removed from their families by child welfare
services, six children could expect to be reunited with their families, but
two of those six would probably be removed again within the next eighteen
months. In this example, four of the original nine children who were
removed would be able to return and remain with their families. However,
this suggests that the rehabilitation rate of the civil system is less than forty-
five percent at eighteen months. 133  While the civil system ultimately
reunites seventy-five percent of the children removed, this terminal success
rate is determined after repeated cycles of removal and reunification. 1
3 4
Furthermore, some scholars question whether the child welfare system
should place such a prioritization on returning children to their biological
families after placement in foster care. 135 In a study examining the behavior
health outcomes for youth who were reunified after placement in foster
care, researchers found that youth who were reunified with their biological
129 See I11. Dep't of Child & Family Servs., Family Reunification, in CHILD WELFARE
RESEARCH REVIEW, VOL. II 226 (Richard Barth et al. eds., 1997) ("In the not-so-short term of
four years [in foster care], two-thirds of children will return home."); Finkelhor et al., supra
note 116, at 6 ("In 1999, 66 percent of children exiting foster care returned to their
families .... Some [of those children], however, need[ed] to re-enter foster care after
reunification because of recurring maltreatment or a renewed risk of maltreatment.").
130 Jakes, supra note 101, at Al ("In 1995 and 1996, 34 percent of kids who were put
under Social Services' care because they were abused, neglected or labeled a person in need
of supervision were back in the social care system within 18 months of going home. In
Albany County, that number was even higher: 49.5 percent."); Ill. Dep't of Child & Family
Servs., supra note 129, at 221 ("30% of the children who entered foster care in 1988 and had
been reunified since then, reentered foster care by the end of 1993.").
131 I11. Dep't of Child & Family Servs., supra note 129, at 219.
132 Id.
133 This is not intended to suggest that the rehabilitation rate of the criminal justice
system is any better, but instead, that the deterrent effects of each system should be
emphasized in evaluating society's approach to protecting children. See ANDREW VON
HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
RESEARCH 1 (1999); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 47 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds., 1978).
134 See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
135 See Heather N. Taussig, Robert B. Clyman & John Landsverk, Children Who Return
Home from Foster Care: A 6-Year Prospective Study of Behavioral Health Outcomes in
Adolescence, 108 PEDIATRICS 10, 10 (July 2001).
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families had more "negative outcomes" than youth who did not reunify. 136
Researchers were careful to note that this study should not be
"misconstrued as an argument against reunification," but rather that it
should caution observers against presuming that reunification results in
positive outcomes. 137 This study also stresses the need to examine child
welfare policy not only on rates of reunification, but also on the long term
impact and deterrent potential of such policy. 38
In researching the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions, Professors
Paul Robinson and John Darley suggested that the most effective deterrence
comes from having a criminal justice system that imposes punishment, not
from the substantive rules that impose liability and punishment.
139
Robinson and Darley observe that because "potential offenders often do not
know... the legal rules," changes to the criminal law and the punishment
imposed on violators often have no deterrent effect. 140  This observation
implies that society can deter undesired behavior merely by calling it
"criminal"--the actual penalties that attach do not matter.
The codification of acts of endangerment, neglect, abuse, and
maltreatment into criminal statutes reflects society's "disapproving
sentiment toward violence in the home, which, in turn, enforces the value
society places on safe homes.' 41 To reflect the value placed on a safe
home accurately, the state must use the most effective means available to
protect individuals from harmful home environments. The positive
correlation between the criminal justice system's involvement and safety
within the home was demonstrated when police increased their involvement
in cases of domestic violence. 142 In that instance, police involvement is
credited with increasing public awareness about domestic violence and
providing help to victims. 43 Because children are less likely to be able to
136 Id. (Researchers analyzed adolescent risk behaviors, life-course outcomes, and current
symptomatologies and concluded that "(r]eunification status was a significant predictor of
negative outcomes" after controlling for length of time in foster care, age, and gender.).
117 Id. at 16.
138 Id.
139 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173-74, 204-05 (2004); see, e.g., VON
HIRSCH, supra note 133, at 45-49 (concluding that having a criminal justice system that
imposes liability and punishment for violations deters).
140 Robinson & Darley, supra note 139, at 173.
141 Vreeland, supra note 103, at 1076-77.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1076 n.201 (citing Donald Bertrand, Domestic Violence Up, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 5, 1998, at 1).
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protect themselves, they may receive an even greater benefit from
intervention by the criminal justice system. 144
IV. PROTECTING CHILDREN THROUGH RISK-OF-INJURY STATUTES
A. CONNECTICUT'S RISK-OF-INJURY STATUTE
In September 2006, the Connecticut Supreme Court unanimously
overturned Judith Scruggs's conviction for creating a home environment
that posed a risk of injury to her son. 145 It held that Connecticut's risk-of-
injury statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Judith's conduct
because she was not on notice that the home's unkempt conditions "were so
squalid that they posed a risk of injury to the mental health" of her son. 14 6
The court reasoned that although Judith may have known that her home's
condition was not optimal, she reasonably could have believed that the
conditions "were within the acceptable range ... [of] generally accepted
housekeeping norms."' 147  Therefore, absent proof that Judith "knew or
should have known that the conditions would constitute a risk of injury to
the mental health of any child," her conviction would comprise a due
process violation for the lack of necessary notice.
148
Despite the various shortcomings of State v. Scruggs, Judith's
prosecution illustrates an attempt by the State to act upon and further its
interest in protecting children from the potential harmful conduct of
adults. 149 In applying Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute to Judith's case,
both the trial court and the state supreme court acknowledged that it was
'44 Id. at 1076.
145 State v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24,40-41 (Conn. 2006).
146 Id. at 36-37, 40.
147 Id. at 36-37.
148 See id. at 36-40. The court noted that if any of a number of situations were present,
Judith would have been provided the requisite notice to preclude the court from reversing her
conviction. Id. at 37-40.
149 See generally CHILD FATALITY REVIEW REPORT, supra note 6, at ii-iii, 19-23. In
investigating Joseph Daniel's death, the Child Fatality Review Panel evaluated the State's
"web of formal and informal systems of protection" designed to ensure the safety and care of
children. Id. at 19. In this web, the "primary safe keepers of children are parents." Id.
However, because some parents either do not or cannot properly care for their children, the
state imposes laws, regulations, and a child welfare system to make "extrafamilial
protections available." Id. The Review Panel concluded that this web of safeguards failed to
ensure Joseph Daniel's care and safety because the safeguards never came together to
adequately respond to the problems he faced. Id. at ii, 41. In response to this failure, it made
a series of recommendations to augment the State's ability to safeguard children; however,
this review was limited to the civil involvement of state agencies because the review of the




enacted to protect children from a broad range of situations that could cause
them harm.15° In analyzing the risk-of-injury statute's application to
Judith's case, the Scruggs courts explained that it was intended to protect
children from any variety of harmful situations, regardless of the legality of
the conduct giving rise to the situation, and without consideration as to
whether the legislature had predicted that a particular conduct could create a
situation that would be potentially harmful to a minor. 15 Although Judith's
conviction was the first case in Connecticut where a parent was convicted
under the risk-of-injury statute after her child's suicide, it was not
unprecedented for the State to charge a parent under the risk-of-injury
statute for exposing a child to some sort of harmful environment.
5 2
Even without a substantive legislative history surrounding
Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute, the state judiciary has time and again
interpreted the statute's purpose consistent with that which was described
by the Scruggs courts. 53 These courts have applied a liberal interpretation
to the statute's already broadly drafted text to permit the statute's
implication in various harmful situations.1 54 This combination of a vague
150 State v. Scruggs, No. CR 020210921S, 2004 WL 1245557, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 8, 2004) (reasoning that Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute seeks to protect children by
broadly mandating "that adults not place a child 'in such a situation that ... [its]
health... [is] likely to be injured"') (citing CoNN. GEN. STATUTES § 53-21(a)(1)), rev'd, 905
A.2d 24, 39-40 (Conn. 2006) ("We are mindful that § 53-21(a)(1) is broadly drafted and was
intended to apply to any conduct, illegal or not, that foreseeably could result in injury to the
health of a child.")).
151 See cases cited supra note 150.
152 See Noreen Gillespie, No Jail for Mom in Son's Suicide, CBS NEWS, May 14, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/14/national/printable617614.shtml ("Legal experts
said they believed it was the first time a parent had ever been convicted in connection with
her child's suicide."); see also State v. Ritrovato, 905 A.2d 1079, 1085, 1100-01 (Conn.
2006) (convicting defendant for creating a risk-of-injury to a minor by providing lysergic
acid diethylamide ("LSD") to a fifteen-year-old as payment for babysitting the defendant's
own children); State v. Padua, 869 A.2d 192, 199-201 (Conn. 2005) (convicting defendants
under the first part of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute for packaging marijuana in the
presence of children); State v. Smith, 869 A.2d 171, 178-79 (Conn. 2005) (convicting
defendant under the first part of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute for placing a toddler on a
bed that also held a rock of crack cocaine); State v. Payne, 695 A.2d 525, 527-28 (Conn.
1997) (convicting defendant under the second part of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute for
forcing children to urinate in a cup under the threat of death); State v. Smalls, 827 A.2d 784,
792-93 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (convicting defendant for creating a risk of injury to a minor
by killing a child's father in the presence of the child).
153 See, e.g., State v. Payne, 695 A.2d 525, 528 (Conn. 1997) (stating that "[t]he general
purpose of [the risk-of-injury statute] is to protect the physical and psychological well-being
of children from the potentially harmful conduct of adults").
154 See, e.g., State v. Eastwood, 850 A.2d 234, 250 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that
the "[l]ack of an actual injury to. .. the victim is irrelevant ... [because] actual injury is not
an element of the offense .... [T]he creation of a prohibited situation is sufficient.") (citing
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statute and a broad judicial interpretation has the potential to present
significant problems relating to notice and consistent application.155
However, a broad, yet constitutional, application enables the state to
intervene in a potentially harmful situation by filing criminal charges before
the at-risk child is actually injured. 156 This is not intended to suggest that
the state does not have options outside the criminal justice system that
could address such situations, 157 but rather, that criminal risk-of-injury
charges are unique tools that may be implemented to shift societal norms
and provide an increased level of protection for children.
158
B. OTHER CRIMINAL RISK-OF-INJURY STATUTES
Although the facts surrounding Judith's prosecution were considered
fairly extraordinary, 159 Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute should not be
considered anything more than a representative example of a legislative
State v. Davila, 816 A.2d 673, 677 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)); State v. Cutro, 657 A.2d 239,
243 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a violation of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute
does not require the victim to be aware of defendant's prohibited conduct).
155 Gillies, supra note 24, at 144-45. Gillies points out that a number of significant
problems may arise from a statute that is broadly drafted and broadly interpreted. Id.
Specifically, she reasons that because a broadly drafted statute (such as Connecticut's risk-
of-injury statute) relies on the prosecutor's discretion in deciding whom to prosecute, the
statute may result in due process violations if a defendant does not have notice as to what
acts are criminal. Id. at 145. This would especially be true if the statute can be applied to
acts that the public would not normally consider criminal. See id. Additionally, Gillies
suggests that a statute that is too broadly drafted and interpreted may result in disparate
treatment of equally culpable individuals and "erroneous verdicts due to juror confusion or
juror bias." Id.
156 Gillies suggests that notwithstanding the potential problems of a broadly drafted and
broadly interpreted statute, the judiciary interprets the risk-of-injury statute broadly to
"allow... a jury, or ... public opinion, to determine which [potentially harmful] actions
should be punished rather than require the legislature to foresee and articulate any possible
action that might harm a child." Id. at 144-45.
157 See supra note 149. "In addition to criminal law... there is also a child welfare
system administered by the Department of Children and Families (DCF)." CHILD FATALITY
REVIEW REPORT, supra note 6, at 19. Established under Conn. Gen. Statutes 17(a)(3), "DCF
is a 'comprehensive, consolidated agency serving children and families. Its mandates
include child protective and family services, juvenile justice services, mental health services,
substance abuse related services, prevention and educational services."' Id. (quoting
Department of Children and Families website, http://www.state.ct.us/def/). The purpose of
DCF is to "'protect children, strengthen families and help young people reach their fullest
potential."' Id. (quoting Department of Children and Families, About the Department,
http://www.dcfstate.ct.us/mission.htm).
158 See Swains, supra note 102, at B2 (quoting Lisa Smith, a special assistant to District
Attorney Charles J. Hynes of Brooklyn, as saying, "Sometimes you need the threat of
prosecution to get people to seek the help they need .... Prosecution is thinking about
prevention of future incidents.").
159 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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attempt to protect children from the harmful conduct of adults. Most states
have enacted some form of a broad child endangerment statute that
establishes criminal liability for subjecting a minor to conduct, or an
omission of conduct, that creates a substantial risk of injury to the minor. 160
Just as other laws addressing commonly legislated issues often vary from
state to state, different states have taken different approaches to
criminalizing conduct that could potentially harm a child. Some states have
enacted specific statutes that criminalize the act of subjecting a minor to
conduct that could injure the child's wellbeing (thereby distinguishing
between child endangerment and child abuse). 16 1 Other states have adopted
a broad interpretation of child abuse so that it includes acts of child
endangerment. 162  Most of these risk-of-injury statutes limit liability to
parents, guardians, or other persons that provide care for, or have custody or
control of, a child. 63  However, a few statutes extend liability to any
160 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-27-206-07 (2006) ("A person commits the offense of
endangering the welfare of a minor.., if [the person] ... engages in conduct creating a
substantial risk of serious harm to the physical or mental welfare of... a minor."); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 273a (West 2006) ("Any person who... willfully causes or permits [a] child
to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished
by imprisonment."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-904 (2005), amended by 2006 HAW. SESS.
LAWS 249 ("A person commits the offense of endangering the welfare of a
minor.., if... the person knowingly endangers the minor's physical or mental welfare by
violating or interfering with any legal duty of care or protection owed such minor."); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (West 2006) ("A... person legally charged with the care or
custody of a minor is guilty of endangering the welfare of a minor when he fails or refuses to
exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming a
neglected... child."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (2006) ("A person is guilty of
endangering the welfare of a child ... if he knowingly endangers the welfare of a
child ... by purposely violating a duty of care, protection or support he owes to such
child."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10-.15 (McKinney 2006) ("A person is guilty of
endangering the welfare of a child when.., he knowingly acts in a manner likely to be
injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304
(2006) ("A... person supervising the welfare of a child.., commits an offense if he
knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or
support."). Cf Endangering Welfare of Children, MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (2007).
161 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-27-205-07; CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a; CONN. GEN.
STAT ANN. § 53-21 (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 709-903.5-09, amended by 2006
HAW. SESS. LAWS 249; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639.3; N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.10-.15; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304.
162 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623 (2006); State v. Mahaney, 975 P.2d 156
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (holding endangerment to be within Arizona's criminal child abuse
statute). Cf UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (2006); Provo City v. Cannon, 994 P.2d 206, 209-
10 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "physical injury," as used in Utah's child abuse
statute, includes conduct that "imperil[s] or threaten[s] a child's health or welfare").
163 See also, e.g., State v. Yates, 876 A.2d 176, 185-86 (N.H. 2005) (scope of term "duty
of care" as applied to endangering the welfare of a child statute refers "only to those who
have a parental or supervisory relationship with a child."). Compare HAW. REV. STAT.
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individual whose conduct could endanger a minor's wellbeing. 164  The
various statutory approaches also differ according to the potential harm to a
minor required to establish a violation' 65 and the degree of punishment
dispensed to offenders.' 66 Despite variations in the approaches employed
by different states, the multitudes of formulations all contain two
fundamental commonalities: first, they are designed to safeguard minors
from the deleterious activities of adults; 167 and second, they create outer
boundaries to a parent's autonomy in directing the upbringing of his or her
child. 161
C. THE DEBATE OVER CRIMINAL RISK-OF-NJURY STATUTES
Opponents to risk-of-injury statutes suggest that the same safeguards
could be achieved by vigorously prosecuting criminal acts directed against
children without relying on criminal risk-of-injury statutes. 169  Georgia
provides a good example of a state that has attempted to follow this
principle. 170  Rather than rely on a broad risk-of-injury statute, Georgia
maintains a series of laws that provide for the prosecution of criminal acts
directed against children.'71 Some laws are specifically tailored to address
the protection of minors. 172 Other laws, however, recognize the reality that
"behavior that is harmful to children ... is often the same behavior that is
harmful to adults.' 73  Thus, the laws proscribe undesirable conduct
regardless of whom it is directed toward. 17
4
By contrast, proponents of risk-of-injury statutes point out that
Georgia's current lack of a child endangerment law results in a variety of
§ 709-904, amended by 2006 HAW. SESS. LAWS 249 (allowing the prosecution of a person
"whether or not charged with the care or custody of a minor"), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT §
4304 (2007) (requiring that the defendant be "[a] parent, guardian or other person
supervising the welfare of a child").
164 See supra note 163.
165 id.
166 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304(b) (2007) (providing that when an offense
involves "a course of conduct" rather than a discrete violation, the offense is upgraded from
a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony).
167 Leheny v. State, 818 S.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Ark. 1991).
168 See supra text accompanying notes 53-68.
169 See Gillies, supra note 24, at 161-62.
170 Oliver & Crossley, supra note 70, at 10.
71 Id. at 11 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(b) (2007) (reckless conduct); GA CODE
ANN. § 16-5-3(a) (2007) (involuntary manslaughter); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-1(b)(3) (2007)
(contributing to the deprivation of a minor); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70(b) (2007) (cruelty to
children)).
172 See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 16-12-1(b)(3).
173 Gillies, supra note 24, at 162.
174 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3(a).
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shortcomings.175  For example, the system does not create liability for
harmful conduct that is specifically directed towards a child, unless the
conduct is independently criminal. 176 Additionally, statutes currently relied
upon require "proof of malice," a hurdle that is insurmountable in many
cases relating to the failure to fulfill a custodial duty. 177 Finally, many of
the current statutes extend criminal liability only to a child's parent or
guardian, and not to other individuals who maintain custody or control of
the child. 78  Regardless of whether these shortcomings hamper the
effectiveness of Georgia's system, attempts by Georgia legislators to
supplement the current statues with a child endangerment statute have been
unsuccessful. 1
79
Following a line of reasoning similar to that of the Georgia legislature,
Lauren Gillies proposed the removal of Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute
under the argument that its benefits were readily ascertainable through other
criminal charges. 180 Gillies reasoned that in instances where a defendant's
conduct gives rise to multiple charges, the benefits associated with bringing
risk-of-injury charges could be obtained by prosecuting the defendant for
his unsavory conduct under only the related criminal charge.' 8' In support
of this proposal, Gillies points out that "[i]n the sixty years that the [risk-of-
injury] statute has existed and in the six hundred times it has been used, it
was only used four times without a concomitant [criminal] charge."'' 82
However, such an argument presumes that the risk-of-injury statute
provides only the same benefits as those achieved through prosecution
under the other criminal statutes. While the risk-of-injury charges and the
other, more narrowly legislated, criminal charges are rooted in similar
underlying philosophies, the mere fact that they were brought concurrently
175 Oliver & Crossley, supra note 70, at 11.
176 Id. at 11-12. For examples of conduct that is independently criminal regardless of
whether it is specifically directed towards a child, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60-3(a)
(involuntary manslaughter), GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (reckless conduct), GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-70(b) (cruelty to children), and GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-1(b)(3) (contributing to the
deprivation of a minor).
177 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 cmt. 7.
178 Id. at cmt. 1.
179 See H.B. 453, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001) (seeking to amend Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-5-73, available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2001-02/sum/hb453.htm, to
create the offense of child endangerment, but currently tabled by H.V. 0631 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2001-02/
votes/hv0361.htm).
180 See Gillies, supra note 24, at 162-63.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 162; see also State v. Schriver, 542 A.2d 686, 687 (Conn. 1988); State v.
George, 656 A.2d 232, 233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); State v. Palangio, 588 A.2d 644, 645
(Conn. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Shaw, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 405, 405 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995).
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should suggest that there were multiple levels to the offense, not that the
broad risk-of-injury statue was superfluous. 183
In evaluating the justification of criminal statutes, scholars generally
invoke four normative underpinnings of the criminal justice system:
deterrence, 184  individual desert, 185  expressive condemnation, 186  and
rehabilitation. 87 At some level, all criminal statues share these core goals
or functions. The legislature enacts criminal statutes to prohibit certain
undesirable behavior and to impose punishment on violators to deter
potential wrongdoers from engaging, or repeat offenders from reengaging,
in the proscribed behavior. 88 The infliction of punishment enables society
to take retributive action against the wrongdoer,' 89 permits the community
to express its condemnation of the wrongdoer's behavior,' 90 and provides
encouragement to the wrongdoer to change his or her ways or be punished
again.' 91 In evaluating a risk-of-injury-to-a-minor or child endangerment
statute against these four considerations, the instances where liability may
attach under a risk-of-injury-to-a-minor statute but not under an alternate
criminal statute are again highlighted. The Child Endangerment Provision
of the Model Penal Code states that the statute is an attempt "to prohibit a
broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of
183 Acknowledging that offenses against minors should be treated differently than
offenses against adults, Gillies suggests replacing Connecticut's risk-of-injury statute with
amendments to other criminal statutes to impose escalated penalties based on the age of the
victim. Gillies, supra note 24, at 162-63. Therefore, in the event that someone was arrested
for driving under the influence and a minor was in the car, rather than maintaining separate
charges of driving under the influence and creating a risk of injury to a minor, the risk-of-
injury-to-a-minor charge would be incorporated in the driving under the influence statue as
an escalated penalty. Id. at 163; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70 (2007) (Connecticut's
Sexual Assault Statute imposes escalated penalties based on the age of the victim).
184 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
396, 399-402 (J. Browring ed., 1843).
185 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194-98, 447-48 (W. Hastie trans.,
1887).
186 See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING
98-101 (1970).
187 See Edward L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 LAW & INEQ. 343
(2001); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1991).
188 See BENTHAM, supra note 184.
189 See KANT, supra note 185, at 196 ("[T]he undeserved evil which any one commits on
another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself.").
190 See FEINBERG, supra note 186, at 98 ("Punishment, in short, has a symbolic
significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.").
191 It is worth noting that critics question "rehabilitation" as a sound function of
punishment because of the dismal track record of penal institutions supposedly designed to
reform wrongdoers. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989)
("Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was
regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases.").
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children .... ,,192 The statute reaches this broad range of conduct by
shifting the focus of prosecution for endangering the welfare of children
"from the mental state of the actor ... to the potential effect that such
[wrongful] conduct may have on the... [wellbeing] of the child or children
who are witness to the conduct."' 93 This shift permits a defendant to be
convicted without requiring that the State demonstrate the defendant's
malice or intent to do harm if he or she should have been aware that the
conduct posed a risk of injury to a minor.
For example, in State v. Riggs, the defendant was warned not to allow
her children to go into a certain area in their trailer park because it
contained an open basement and an unfenced duck pond.194 Nonetheless,
the defendant left her two children, ages four and two, outside unattended to
play for about forty-five minutes.195 During that time, the two children
wandered into the restricted area and the two-year-old drowned in the duck
pond. 96  The defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of
involuntary manslaughter and one count of endangering the welfare of a
child. 197 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the involuntary
manslaughter conviction, holding that the defendant's "omission to watch
her child was not reckless conduct to such an extreme that it r[ose] to the
level required to be liable for homicide."' 98 However, the appellate court
affirmed the child endangerment conviction because although the defendant
did nothing to demonstrate an intent to harm her child, "a reasonable juror
could have found that leaving a two-year-old child outside for forty-five
minutes, coupled with a warning.. . about the unfenced duck pond, put that
child at risk, and defendant by her inaction knowingly endangered her
child."' 99 As Riggs demonstrates, in applying a child endangerment statute,
the prosecution is generally not required to prove that the defendant knew
that the risk could result in injury or death, but only that a reasonable person
would recognize that the risk existed. 00 Under most risk-of-injury-to-a-
minor statutes, if faced with circumstances similar to those in Riggs, a court
could convict the defendant of endangering a minor even if the child had
192 Endangering Welfare of Children, MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 1 (2001).
19' Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3.
194 2 S.W.3d 867, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
"9 Id. at 868.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 869, 872.
1' Id. at 872.




been rescued from the pond or had been discovered playing unsupervised at
the pond's edge.201
In addition to permitting the state to prosecute a defendant for harmful
conduct that would otherwise go unpunished, risk-of-injury-to-a-minor and
child endangerment statutes have the capacity for their respective charges to
function as bargaining chips for prosecutors.0 2 If a defendant's conduct
implicates both a risk-of-injury-to-a-minor charge and another separate
criminal charge, 0 3 the prosecutor can offer to drop one of the charges in
exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to the other charge.204 This option
not only allows prosecutors to plead out cases they would otherwise have to
take to trial, but also gives prosecutors the ability to drop charges that they
would likely be unsuccessful in prosecuting. If the prosecutor determines
that a defendant's conduct warrants prosecution, the child endangerment
charges allow the state flexibility in the prosecution of the defendant
according to the circumstances specific to the case.20 5
V. CONCLUSION
The state's interest in protecting children from physical harm is well
developed. Generally, there is not a question of conflicting interests when
the state intervenes to prevent a parent from physically or sexually abusing
a child. In cases involving a violent or sexual offense, the offending parent
is deemed unfit by society, and the state's interest in protecting the child's
physical wellbeing is considered paramount to any residual interest claimed
by the abusing parent. However, as child protection has become a more
prominent public concern, the state has developed an interest in protecting
children from less tangible harms as well. To ensure that children have the
capacity to develop and flourish as productive members of society, the state
has recognized an interest in protecting their emotional welfare and
psychological development-after all, today's children are tomorrow's
adults. Although parents maintain an inherent interest in directing the
upbringing of their children, they must do so within the confines required
201 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text; see also Oliver & Crossley, supra note
70, at 64.
202 See Gillies, supra note 24, at 163.
203 See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 152 Misc. 2d 436, 437, 440 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991)
(defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated with two children as passengers
in the car was held sufficient prima facie evidence of endangering the welfare of a child); see
also supra note 183.
204 See Gillies, supra note 24, at 163.
205 See State v. Scruggs, No. CR 020210921S, 2004 WL 1245557 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
8, 2004), rev 'd, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006) (convicting Judith Scruggs of one count of risk of
injury to a child, although she was charged with two counts of risk of injury to a child and
one count of cruelty to persons).
[Vol. 98
2007] PROTECTING CHILDREN 327
by society. By imposing criminal liability, rather than civil remedies, in
situations where an adult places a child's physical, psychological, or
emotional wellbeing at risk, the state will serve the dual purposes of
influencing the social expectations regarding these situations and better
protecting children from the harmful behavior of adults.
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